学院2017年第六十六次学术讲座

主讲人：叶立新教授

单位：俄亥俄州立大学经济系、香港中文大学深圳分校经管学院

题目：Optimal Two-stage Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition

时间：2017年10月27日（周五）上午9：30

地点：学院402会议室

摘要：We study optimal two-stage mechanisms in an auction environment where bidders are endowed with original estimates ("types") about their private values and can further learn their true values of the object for sale by incurring an entry cost. We first derive an integral form of the envelope formula as required by incentive compatible two-stage mechanisms, based on which we demonstrate that the optimality of the generalized Myerson allocation rule is robust to our setting with costly information acquisition. Optimal entry is thus to admit the set of bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by both the second-stage signal and entry cost. We show that our optimal entry and allocation rules are both IR and IC implementable. Our analytical framework is general enough to encompass many existing models in the literature on auctions with costly entry.

作者简介：叶立新教授，斯坦福大学经济学博士，现为俄亥俄州立大学经济系教授，同时也兼任香港中文大学深圳分校经管学院经济学理硕士课程的学术主任。叶立新教授的研究主攻方向是微观经济学，市场设计，产业组织结构和公司契约理论，目前的研究集中于二阶段拍卖，非线性定价，无线电波共享，已在Theoretical Economics、Journal of Industrial Economics、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Theory等经济学期刊上发表论文20余篇。叶立新教授的跨学科研究还得到美国自然科学基金的资助。