讲座题目：Optimal Certification Design

主讲嘉宾：裴挺 讲师 （我校）

讲座时间：2023年12月13日（周三）下午14：00开始

讲座地点：太阳成集团tyc33455cc402室

主办单位：太阳成集团tyc33455cc  我校创新发展研究中心

摘要： We study the optimal certification design in an environment in which the certification institute charges a uniform price to certify firms with heterogeneous types and outside options. We find that the optimal certification depends not only on the surplus/deficit between firm's true and outside payoff associated with the price but also on the true value a firm stands. For a subset of firms, the Top Cover Condition (TCC), i.e., the surplus covers the deficit for any top percentile firms, is necessary to certify the firms with some incentive compatible policy. When the outside options are non-decreasing, we show the sufficiency of TCC and the number of certificates required in the certification. We further provide an algorithm to find the optimal set of firms to certify with a given price. We find that the institute will exclude firms with high deficit. Moreover, with same deficit, those firms with both high true value and outside options will be excluded prior to ones with low true value.

讲座嘉宾简介：

裴挺，毕业于新加坡国立大学，现任太阳成集团tyc33455cc讲师。研究领域为博弈论，信息设计，网络博弈等。论文发表于Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory等期刊。